hanchenye-llvm-project/lld/ELF/Config.h

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//===- Config.h -------------------------------------------------*- C++ -*-===//
//
// The LLVM Linker
//
// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#ifndef LLD_ELF_CONFIG_H
#define LLD_ELF_CONFIG_H
#include "lld/Common/ErrorHandler.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/MapVector.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringRef.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringSet.h"
#include "llvm/BinaryFormat/ELF.h"
#include "llvm/Support/CachePruning.h"
#include "llvm/Support/CodeGen.h"
#include "llvm/Support/Endian.h"
#include <vector>
namespace lld {
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namespace elf {
class InputFile;
class InputSectionBase;
enum ELFKind {
ELFNoneKind,
ELF32LEKind,
ELF32BEKind,
ELF64LEKind,
ELF64BEKind
};
// For --build-id.
enum class BuildIdKind { None, Fast, Md5, Sha1, Hexstring, Uuid };
// For --discard-{all,locals,none}.
enum class DiscardPolicy { Default, All, Locals, None };
// For --strip-{all,debug}.
enum class StripPolicy { None, All, Debug };
// For --unresolved-symbols.
enum class UnresolvedPolicy { ReportError, Warn, Ignore, IgnoreAll };
// For --orphan-handling.
enum class OrphanHandlingPolicy { Place, Warn, Error };
// For --sort-section and linkerscript sorting rules.
enum class SortSectionPolicy { Default, None, Alignment, Name, Priority };
// For --target2
enum class Target2Policy { Abs, Rel, GotRel };
struct SymbolVersion {
llvm::StringRef Name;
bool IsExternCpp;
bool HasWildcard;
};
// This struct contains symbols version definition that
// can be found in version script if it is used for link.
struct VersionDefinition {
llvm::StringRef Name;
uint16_t Id = 0;
std::vector<SymbolVersion> Globals;
size_t NameOff = 0; // Offset in the string table
};
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// This struct contains the global configuration for the linker.
// Most fields are direct mapping from the command line options
// and such fields have the same name as the corresponding options.
// Most fields are initialized by the driver.
struct Configuration {
uint8_t OSABI = 0;
llvm::CachePruningPolicy ThinLTOCachePolicy;
llvm::StringMap<uint64_t> SectionStartMap;
llvm::StringRef Chroot;
llvm::StringRef DynamicLinker;
llvm::StringRef Entry;
llvm::StringRef Emulation;
llvm::StringRef Fini;
llvm::StringRef Init;
llvm::StringRef LTOAAPipeline;
llvm::StringRef LTONewPmPasses;
llvm::StringRef LTOObjPath;
llvm::StringRef LTOSampleProfile;
llvm::StringRef MapFile;
llvm::StringRef OutputFile;
llvm::StringRef OptRemarksFilename;
llvm::StringRef ProgName;
llvm::StringRef SoName;
llvm::StringRef Sysroot;
llvm::StringRef ThinLTOCacheDir;
llvm::StringRef ThinLTOIndexOnlyArg;
std::pair<llvm::StringRef, llvm::StringRef> ThinLTOObjectSuffixReplace;
std::pair<llvm::StringRef, llvm::StringRef> ThinLTOPrefixReplace;
std::string Rpath;
std::vector<VersionDefinition> VersionDefinitions;
std::vector<llvm::StringRef> AuxiliaryList;
std::vector<llvm::StringRef> FilterList;
std::vector<llvm::StringRef> SearchPaths;
std::vector<llvm::StringRef> SymbolOrderingFile;
std::vector<llvm::StringRef> Undefined;
std::vector<SymbolVersion> DynamicList;
std::vector<SymbolVersion> VersionScriptGlobals;
std::vector<SymbolVersion> VersionScriptLocals;
std::vector<uint8_t> BuildIdVector;
llvm::MapVector<std::pair<const InputSectionBase *, const InputSectionBase *>,
uint64_t>
CallGraphProfile;
bool AllowMultipleDefinition;
bool AndroidPackDynRelocs = false;
bool ARMHasBlx = false;
bool ARMHasMovtMovw = false;
bool ARMJ1J2BranchEncoding = false;
bool AsNeeded = false;
bool Bsymbolic;
bool BsymbolicFunctions;
bool CheckSections;
bool CompressDebugSections;
bool Cref;
bool DefineCommon;
bool Demangle = true;
bool DisableVerify;
bool EhFrameHdr;
bool EmitRelocs;
bool EnableNewDtags;
bool ExportDynamic;
bool FixCortexA53Errata843419;
bool GcSections;
bool GdbIndex;
bool GnuHash = false;
bool GnuUnique;
bool HasDynamicList = false;
bool HasDynSymTab;
bool ICF;
bool IgnoreDataAddressEquality;
bool IgnoreFunctionAddressEquality;
bool LTODebugPassManager;
bool LTONewPassManager;
bool MergeArmExidx;
bool MipsN32Abi = false;
bool NoinhibitExec;
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bool Nostdlib;
bool OFormatBinary;
bool Omagic;
bool OptRemarksWithHotness;
bool Pie;
bool PrintGcSections;
bool PrintIcfSections;
bool Relocatable;
bool SaveTemps;
bool SingleRoRx;
bool Shared;
bool Static = false;
bool SysvHash = false;
bool Target1Rel;
bool Trace;
bool ThinLTOEmitImportsFiles;
bool ThinLTOIndexOnly;
bool UndefinedVersion;
Add --warn-backrefs to maintain compatibility with other linkers I'm proposing a new command line flag, --warn-backrefs in this patch. The flag and the feature proposed below don't exist in GNU linkers nor the current lld. --warn-backrefs is an option to detect reverse or cyclic dependencies between static archives, and it can be used to keep your program compatible with GNU linkers after you switch to lld. I'll explain the feature and why you may find it useful below. lld's symbol resolution semantics is more relaxed than traditional Unix linkers. Therefore, ld.lld foo.a bar.o succeeds even if bar.o contains an undefined symbol that have to be resolved by some object file in foo.a. Traditional Unix linkers don't allow this kind of backward reference, as they visit each file only once from left to right in the command line while resolving all undefined symbol at the moment of visiting. In the above case, since there's no undefined symbol when a linker visits foo.a, no files are pulled out from foo.a, and because the linker forgets about foo.a after visiting, it can't resolve undefined symbols that could have been resolved otherwise. That lld accepts more relaxed form means (besides it makes more sense) that you can accidentally write a command line or a build file that works only with lld, even if you have a plan to distribute it to wider users who may be using GNU linkers. With --check-library-dependency, you can detect a library order that doesn't work with other Unix linkers. The option is also useful to detect cyclic dependencies between static archives. Again, lld accepts ld.lld foo.a bar.a even if foo.a and bar.a depend on each other. With --warn-backrefs it is handled as an error. Here is how the option works. We assign a group ID to each file. A file with a smaller group ID can pull out object files from an archive file with an equal or greater group ID. Otherwise, it is a reverse dependency and an error. A file outside --{start,end}-group gets a fresh ID when instantiated. All files within the same --{start,end}-group get the same group ID. E.g. ld.lld A B --start-group C D --end-group E A and B form group 0, C, D and their member object files form group 1, and E forms group 2. I think that you can see how this group assignment rule simulates the traditional linker's semantics. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D45195 llvm-svn: 329636
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bool WarnBackrefs;
bool WarnCommon;
bool WarnMissingEntry;
bool WarnSymbolOrdering;
bool WriteAddends;
bool ZCombreloc;
bool ZCopyreloc;
bool ZExecstack;
bool ZHazardplt;
bool ZKeepTextSectionPrefix;
bool ZNodelete;
bool ZNodlopen;
bool ZNow;
bool ZOrigin;
bool ZRelro;
bool ZRodynamic;
bool ZText;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
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bool ZRetpolineplt;
bool ZWxneeded;
DiscardPolicy Discard;
OrphanHandlingPolicy OrphanHandling;
SortSectionPolicy SortSection;
StripPolicy Strip;
UnresolvedPolicy UnresolvedSymbols;
Target2Policy Target2;
BuildIdKind BuildId = BuildIdKind::None;
ELFKind EKind = ELFNoneKind;
uint16_t DefaultSymbolVersion = llvm::ELF::VER_NDX_GLOBAL;
uint16_t EMachine = llvm::ELF::EM_NONE;
llvm::Optional<uint64_t> ImageBase;
uint64_t MaxPageSize;
uint64_t ZStackSize;
unsigned LTOPartitions;
unsigned LTOO;
unsigned Optimize;
unsigned ThinLTOJobs;
// The following config options do not directly correspond to any
// particualr command line options.
// True if we need to pass through relocations in input files to the
// output file. Usually false because we consume relocations.
bool CopyRelocs;
// True if the target is ELF64. False if ELF32.
bool Is64;
// True if the target is little-endian. False if big-endian.
bool IsLE;
// endianness::little if IsLE is true. endianness::big otherwise.
llvm::support::endianness Endianness;
// True if the target is the little-endian MIPS64.
//
// The reason why we have this variable only for the MIPS is because
// we use this often. Some ELF headers for MIPS64EL are in a
// mixed-endian (which is horrible and I'd say that's a serious spec
// bug), and we need to know whether we are reading MIPS ELF files or
// not in various places.
//
// (Note that MIPS64EL is not a typo for MIPS64LE. This is the official
// name whatever that means. A fun hypothesis is that "EL" is short for
// little-endian written in the little-endian order, but I don't know
// if that's true.)
bool IsMips64EL;
// Holds set of ELF header flags for the target.
uint32_t EFlags = 0;
// The ELF spec defines two types of relocation table entries, RELA and
// REL. RELA is a triplet of (offset, info, addend) while REL is a
// tuple of (offset, info). Addends for REL are implicit and read from
// the location where the relocations are applied. So, REL is more
// compact than RELA but requires a bit of more work to process.
//
// (From the linker writer's view, this distinction is not necessary.
// If the ELF had chosen whichever and sticked with it, it would have
// been easier to write code to process relocations, but it's too late
// to change the spec.)
//
// Each ABI defines its relocation type. IsRela is true if target
// uses RELA. As far as we know, all 64-bit ABIs are using RELA. A
// few 32-bit ABIs are using RELA too.
bool IsRela;
// True if we are creating position-independent code.
bool Pic;
// 4 for ELF32, 8 for ELF64.
int Wordsize;
};
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// The only instance of Configuration struct.
extern Configuration *Config;
static inline void errorOrWarn(const Twine &Msg) {
if (!Config->NoinhibitExec)
error(Msg);
else
warn(Msg);
}
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} // namespace elf
} // namespace lld
#endif