hanchenye-llvm-project/lld/ELF/Arch/X86.cpp

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//===- X86.cpp ------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#include "InputFiles.h"
#include "Symbols.h"
#include "SyntheticSections.h"
#include "Target.h"
#include "lld/Common/ErrorHandler.h"
#include "llvm/Support/Endian.h"
using namespace llvm;
using namespace llvm::support::endian;
using namespace llvm::ELF;
using namespace lld;
using namespace lld::elf;
namespace {
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
class X86 : public TargetInfo {
public:
X86();
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
int getTlsGdRelaxSkip(RelType type) const override;
RelExpr getRelExpr(RelType type, const Symbol &s,
const uint8_t *loc) const override;
int64_t getImplicitAddend(const uint8_t *buf, RelType type) const override;
void writeGotPltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
RelType getDynRel(RelType type) const override;
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
void writeIgotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr, uint64_t pltEntryAddr,
int32_t index, unsigned relOff) const override;
void relocateOne(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const override;
RelExpr adjustRelaxExpr(RelType type, const uint8_t *data,
RelExpr expr) const override;
void relaxTlsGdToIe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const override;
void relaxTlsGdToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const override;
void relaxTlsIeToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const override;
void relaxTlsLdToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const override;
};
} // namespace
X86::X86() {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
copyRel = R_386_COPY;
gotRel = R_386_GLOB_DAT;
noneRel = R_386_NONE;
pltRel = R_386_JUMP_SLOT;
iRelativeRel = R_386_IRELATIVE;
relativeRel = R_386_RELATIVE;
symbolicRel = R_386_32;
tlsGotRel = R_386_TLS_TPOFF;
tlsModuleIndexRel = R_386_TLS_DTPMOD32;
tlsOffsetRel = R_386_TLS_DTPOFF32;
pltEntrySize = 16;
pltHeaderSize = 16;
trapInstr = {0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc}; // 0xcc = INT3
// Align to the non-PAE large page size (known as a superpage or huge page).
// FreeBSD automatically promotes large, superpage-aligned allocations.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
defaultImageBase = 0x400000;
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
int X86::getTlsGdRelaxSkip(RelType type) const {
return 2;
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
RelExpr X86::getRelExpr(RelType type, const Symbol &s,
const uint8_t *loc) const {
// There are 4 different TLS variable models with varying degrees of
// flexibility and performance. LocalExec and InitialExec models are fast but
// less-flexible models. If they are in use, we set DF_STATIC_TLS flag in the
// dynamic section to let runtime know about that.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
if (type == R_386_TLS_LE || type == R_386_TLS_LE_32 || type == R_386_TLS_IE ||
type == R_386_TLS_GOTIE)
config->hasStaticTlsModel = true;
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
switch (type) {
case R_386_8:
case R_386_16:
case R_386_32:
return R_ABS;
case R_386_TLS_LDO_32:
return R_DTPREL;
case R_386_TLS_GD:
return R_TLSGD_GOTPLT;
case R_386_TLS_LDM:
return R_TLSLD_GOTPLT;
case R_386_PLT32:
return R_PLT_PC;
case R_386_PC8:
case R_386_PC16:
case R_386_PC32:
return R_PC;
case R_386_GOTPC:
return R_GOTPLTONLY_PC;
case R_386_TLS_IE:
return R_GOT;
case R_386_GOT32:
case R_386_GOT32X:
2017-10-12 10:09:11 +08:00
// These relocations are arguably mis-designed because their calculations
// depend on the instructions they are applied to. This is bad because we
// usually don't care about whether the target section contains valid
// machine instructions or not. But this is part of the documented ABI, so
// we had to implement as the standard requires.
//
2017-10-12 10:09:11 +08:00
// x86 does not support PC-relative data access. Therefore, in order to
// access GOT contents, a GOT address needs to be known at link-time
// (which means non-PIC) or compilers have to emit code to get a GOT
// address at runtime (which means code is position-independent but
// compilers need to emit extra code for each GOT access.) This decision
// is made at compile-time. In the latter case, compilers emit code to
// load an GOT address to a register, which is usually %ebx.
//
// So, there are two ways to refer to symbol foo's GOT entry: foo@GOT or
// foo@GOT(%ebx).
2017-10-12 10:09:11 +08:00
//
// foo@GOT is not usable in PIC. If we are creating a PIC output and if we
// find such relocation, we should report an error. foo@GOT is resolved to
// an *absolute* address of foo's GOT entry, because both GOT address and
// foo's offset are known. In other words, it's G + A.
//
// foo@GOT(%ebx) needs to be resolved to a *relative* offset from a GOT to
2017-10-12 10:09:11 +08:00
// foo's GOT entry in the table, because GOT address is not known but foo's
// offset in the table is known. It's G + A - GOT.
//
// It's unfortunate that compilers emit the same relocation for these
// different use cases. In order to distinguish them, we have to read a
// machine instruction.
//
// The following code implements it. We assume that Loc[0] is the first byte
// of a displacement or an immediate field of a valid machine
2017-10-12 10:09:11 +08:00
// instruction. That means a ModRM byte is at Loc[-1]. By taking a look at
// the byte, we can determine whether the instruction uses the operand as an
// absolute address (R_GOT) or a register-relative address (R_GOTPLT).
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return (loc[-1] & 0xc7) == 0x5 ? R_GOT : R_GOTPLT;
case R_386_TLS_GOTIE:
return R_GOTPLT;
case R_386_GOTOFF:
return R_GOTPLTREL;
case R_386_TLS_LE:
return R_TLS;
case R_386_TLS_LE_32:
return R_NEG_TLS;
case R_386_NONE:
return R_NONE;
default:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
error(getErrorLocation(loc) + "unknown relocation (" + Twine(type) +
") against symbol " + toString(s));
return R_NONE;
}
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
RelExpr X86::adjustRelaxExpr(RelType type, const uint8_t *data,
RelExpr expr) const {
switch (expr) {
default:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return expr;
case R_RELAX_TLS_GD_TO_IE:
return R_RELAX_TLS_GD_TO_IE_GOTPLT;
case R_RELAX_TLS_GD_TO_LE:
return R_RELAX_TLS_GD_TO_LE_NEG;
}
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::writeGotPltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
write32le(buf, mainPart->dynamic->getVA());
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
// Entries in .got.plt initially points back to the corresponding
// PLT entries with a fixed offset to skip the first instruction.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
write32le(buf, s.getPltVA() + 6);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::writeIgotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
// An x86 entry is the address of the ifunc resolver function.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
write32le(buf, s.getVA());
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
RelType X86::getDynRel(RelType type) const {
if (type == R_386_TLS_LE)
return R_386_TLS_TPOFF;
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
if (type == R_386_TLS_LE_32)
return R_386_TLS_TPOFF32;
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return type;
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
if (config->isPic) {
const uint8_t v[] = {
0xff, 0xb3, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // pushl 4(%ebx)
0xff, 0xa3, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // jmp *8(%ebx)
0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90 // nop
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, v, sizeof(v));
return;
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
const uint8_t pltData[] = {
0xff, 0x35, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushl (GOTPLT+4)
0xff, 0x25, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp *(GOTPLT+8)
0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, // nop
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, pltData, sizeof(pltData));
uint32_t gotPlt = in.gotPlt->getVA();
write32le(buf + 2, gotPlt + 4);
write32le(buf + 8, gotPlt + 8);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr,
uint64_t pltEntryAddr, int32_t index,
unsigned relOff) const {
if (config->isPic) {
const uint8_t inst[] = {
2019-04-01 08:25:17 +08:00
0xff, 0xa3, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp *foo@GOT(%ebx)
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushl $reloc_offset
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp .PLT0@PC
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, inst, sizeof(inst));
write32le(buf + 2, gotPltEntryAddr - in.gotPlt->getVA());
} else {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
const uint8_t inst[] = {
2019-04-01 08:25:17 +08:00
0xff, 0x25, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp *foo@GOT
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushl $reloc_offset
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp .PLT0@PC
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, inst, sizeof(inst));
write32le(buf + 2, gotPltEntryAddr);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
write32le(buf + 7, relOff);
write32le(buf + 12, -pltHeaderSize - pltEntrySize * index - 16);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
int64_t X86::getImplicitAddend(const uint8_t *buf, RelType type) const {
switch (type) {
case R_386_8:
case R_386_PC8:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return SignExtend64<8>(*buf);
case R_386_16:
case R_386_PC16:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return SignExtend64<16>(read16le(buf));
case R_386_32:
case R_386_GOT32:
case R_386_GOT32X:
case R_386_GOTOFF:
case R_386_GOTPC:
case R_386_PC32:
case R_386_PLT32:
case R_386_TLS_LDO_32:
case R_386_TLS_LE:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
return SignExtend64<32>(read32le(buf));
default:
return 0;
}
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::relocateOne(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const {
switch (type) {
case R_386_8:
// R_386_{PC,}{8,16} are not part of the i386 psABI, but they are
// being used for some 16-bit programs such as boot loaders, so
// we want to support them.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
checkIntUInt(loc, val, 8, type);
*loc = val;
break;
case R_386_PC8:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
checkInt(loc, val, 8, type);
*loc = val;
break;
case R_386_16:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
checkIntUInt(loc, val, 16, type);
write16le(loc, val);
break;
case R_386_PC16:
// R_386_PC16 is normally used with 16 bit code. In that situation
// the PC is 16 bits, just like the addend. This means that it can
// point from any 16 bit address to any other if the possibility
// of wrapping is included.
// The only restriction we have to check then is that the destination
// address fits in 16 bits. That is impossible to do here. The problem is
// that we are passed the final value, which already had the
// current location subtracted from it.
// We just check that Val fits in 17 bits. This misses some cases, but
// should have no false positives.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
checkInt(loc, val, 17, type);
write16le(loc, val);
break;
case R_386_32:
case R_386_GOT32:
case R_386_GOT32X:
case R_386_GOTOFF:
case R_386_GOTPC:
case R_386_PC32:
case R_386_PLT32:
case R_386_RELATIVE:
case R_386_TLS_DTPMOD32:
case R_386_TLS_DTPOFF32:
case R_386_TLS_GD:
case R_386_TLS_GOTIE:
case R_386_TLS_IE:
case R_386_TLS_LDM:
case R_386_TLS_LDO_32:
case R_386_TLS_LE:
case R_386_TLS_LE_32:
case R_386_TLS_TPOFF:
case R_386_TLS_TPOFF32:
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
checkInt(loc, val, 32, type);
write32le(loc, val);
break;
default:
llvm_unreachable("unknown relocation");
}
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::relaxTlsGdToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const {
// Convert
// leal x@tlsgd(, %ebx, 1),
// call __tls_get_addr@plt
// to
// movl %gs:0,%eax
// subl $x@ntpoff,%eax
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
const uint8_t inst[] = {
0x65, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // movl %gs:0, %eax
0x81, 0xe8, 0, 0, 0, 0, // subl Val(%ebx), %eax
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(loc - 3, inst, sizeof(inst));
write32le(loc + 5, val);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::relaxTlsGdToIe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const {
// Convert
// leal x@tlsgd(, %ebx, 1),
// call __tls_get_addr@plt
// to
// movl %gs:0, %eax
// addl x@gotntpoff(%ebx), %eax
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
const uint8_t inst[] = {
0x65, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // movl %gs:0, %eax
0x03, 0x83, 0, 0, 0, 0, // addl Val(%ebx), %eax
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(loc - 3, inst, sizeof(inst));
write32le(loc + 5, val);
}
// In some conditions, relocations can be optimized to avoid using GOT.
// This function does that for Initial Exec to Local Exec case.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::relaxTlsIeToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const {
// Ulrich's document section 6.2 says that @gotntpoff can
// be used with MOVL or ADDL instructions.
// @indntpoff is similar to @gotntpoff, but for use in
// position dependent code.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
uint8_t reg = (loc[-1] >> 3) & 7;
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
if (type == R_386_TLS_IE) {
if (loc[-1] == 0xa1) {
// "movl foo@indntpoff,%eax" -> "movl $foo,%eax"
// This case is different from the generic case below because
// this is a 5 byte instruction while below is 6 bytes.
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
loc[-1] = 0xb8;
} else if (loc[-2] == 0x8b) {
// "movl foo@indntpoff,%reg" -> "movl $foo,%reg"
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
loc[-2] = 0xc7;
loc[-1] = 0xc0 | reg;
} else {
// "addl foo@indntpoff,%reg" -> "addl $foo,%reg"
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
loc[-2] = 0x81;
loc[-1] = 0xc0 | reg;
}
} else {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
assert(type == R_386_TLS_GOTIE);
if (loc[-2] == 0x8b) {
// "movl foo@gottpoff(%rip),%reg" -> "movl $foo,%reg"
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
loc[-2] = 0xc7;
loc[-1] = 0xc0 | reg;
} else {
// "addl foo@gotntpoff(%rip),%reg" -> "leal foo(%reg),%reg"
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
loc[-2] = 0x8d;
loc[-1] = 0x80 | (reg << 3) | reg;
}
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
write32le(loc, val);
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void X86::relaxTlsLdToLe(uint8_t *loc, RelType type, uint64_t val) const {
if (type == R_386_TLS_LDO_32) {
write32le(loc, val);
return;
}
// Convert
// leal foo(%reg),%eax
// call ___tls_get_addr
// to
// movl %gs:0,%eax
// nop
// leal 0(%esi,1),%esi
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
const uint8_t inst[] = {
0x65, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // movl %gs:0,%eax
0x90, // nop
0x8d, 0x74, 0x26, 0x00, // leal 0(%esi,1),%esi
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(loc - 2, inst, sizeof(inst));
}
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
namespace {
class RetpolinePic : public X86 {
public:
RetpolinePic();
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr, uint64_t pltEntryAddr,
int32_t index, unsigned relOff) const override;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
class RetpolineNoPic : public X86 {
public:
RetpolineNoPic();
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const override;
void writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const override;
void writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr, uint64_t pltEntryAddr,
int32_t index, unsigned relOff) const override;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
} // namespace
RetpolinePic::RetpolinePic() {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
pltHeaderSize = 48;
pltEntrySize = 32;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolinePic::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
write32le(buf, s.getPltVA() + 17);
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolinePic::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
const uint8_t insn[] = {
0xff, 0xb3, 4, 0, 0, 0, // 0: pushl 4(%ebx)
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
0x50, // 6: pushl %eax
0x8b, 0x83, 8, 0, 0, 0, // 7: mov 8(%ebx), %eax
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
0xe8, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // d: call next
0xf3, 0x90, // 12: loop: pause
0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8, // 14: lfence
0xeb, 0xf9, // 17: jmp loop
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 19: int3; .align 16
0x89, 0x0c, 0x24, // 20: next: mov %ecx, (%esp)
0x8b, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x04, // 23: mov 0x4(%esp), %ecx
0x89, 0x44, 0x24, 0x04, // 27: mov %eax ,0x4(%esp)
0x89, 0xc8, // 2b: mov %ecx, %eax
0x59, // 2d: pop %ecx
0xc3, // 2e: ret
0xcc, // 2f: int3; padding
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolinePic::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr,
uint64_t pltEntryAddr, int32_t index,
unsigned relOff) const {
const uint8_t insn[] = {
0x50, // pushl %eax
0x8b, 0x83, 0, 0, 0, 0, // mov foo@GOT(%ebx), %eax
0xe8, 0, 0, 0, 0, // call plt+0x20
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp plt+0x12
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // pushl $reloc_offset
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // jmp plt+0
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // int3; padding
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
uint32_t ebx = in.gotPlt->getVA();
unsigned off = pltHeaderSize + pltEntrySize * index;
write32le(buf + 3, gotPltEntryAddr - ebx);
write32le(buf + 8, -off - 12 + 32);
write32le(buf + 13, -off - 17 + 18);
write32le(buf + 18, relOff);
write32le(buf + 23, -off - 27);
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
RetpolineNoPic::RetpolineNoPic() {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
pltHeaderSize = 48;
pltEntrySize = 32;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolineNoPic::writeGotPlt(uint8_t *buf, const Symbol &s) const {
write32le(buf, s.getPltVA() + 16);
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolineNoPic::writePltHeader(uint8_t *buf) const {
const uint8_t insn[] = {
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
0xff, 0x35, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 0: pushl GOTPLT+4
0x50, // 6: pushl %eax
0xa1, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 7: mov GOTPLT+8, %eax
0xe8, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // c: call next
0xf3, 0x90, // 11: loop: pause
0x0f, 0xae, 0xe8, // 13: lfence
0xeb, 0xf9, // 16: jmp loop
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 18: int3
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 1f: int3; .align 16
0x89, 0x0c, 0x24, // 20: next: mov %ecx, (%esp)
0x8b, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x04, // 23: mov 0x4(%esp), %ecx
0x89, 0x44, 0x24, 0x04, // 27: mov %eax ,0x4(%esp)
0x89, 0xc8, // 2b: mov %ecx, %eax
0x59, // 2d: pop %ecx
0xc3, // 2e: ret
0xcc, // 2f: int3; padding
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
uint32_t gotPlt = in.gotPlt->getVA();
write32le(buf + 2, gotPlt + 4);
write32le(buf + 8, gotPlt + 8);
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
void RetpolineNoPic::writePlt(uint8_t *buf, uint64_t gotPltEntryAddr,
uint64_t pltEntryAddr, int32_t index,
unsigned relOff) const {
const uint8_t insn[] = {
0x50, // 0: pushl %eax
0xa1, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 1: mov foo_in_GOT, %eax
0xe8, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 6: call plt+0x20
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // b: jmp plt+0x11
0x68, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 10: pushl $reloc_offset
0xe9, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 15: jmp plt+0
0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, // 1a: int3; padding
0xcc, // 1f: int3; padding
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
};
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
memcpy(buf, insn, sizeof(insn));
unsigned off = pltHeaderSize + pltEntrySize * index;
write32le(buf + 2, gotPltEntryAddr);
write32le(buf + 7, -off - 11 + 32);
write32le(buf + 12, -off - 16 + 17);
write32le(buf + 17, relOff);
write32le(buf + 22, -off - 26);
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
TargetInfo *elf::getX86TargetInfo() {
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
if (config->zRetpolineplt) {
if (config->isPic) {
static RetpolinePic t;
return &t;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
static RetpolineNoPic t;
return &t;
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-23 06:05:25 +08:00
}
[Coding style change] Rename variables so that they start with a lowercase letter This patch is mechanically generated by clang-llvm-rename tool that I wrote using Clang Refactoring Engine just for creating this patch. You can see the source code of the tool at https://reviews.llvm.org/D64123. There's no manual post-processing; you can generate the same patch by re-running the tool against lld's code base. Here is the main discussion thread to change the LLVM coding style: https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-February/130083.html In the discussion thread, I proposed we use lld as a testbed for variable naming scheme change, and this patch does that. I chose to rename variables so that they are in camelCase, just because that is a minimal change to make variables to start with a lowercase letter. Note to downstream patch maintainers: if you are maintaining a downstream lld repo, just rebasing ahead of this commit would cause massive merge conflicts because this patch essentially changes every line in the lld subdirectory. But there's a remedy. clang-llvm-rename tool is a batch tool, so you can rename variables in your downstream repo with the tool. Given that, here is how to rebase your repo to a commit after the mass renaming: 1. rebase to the commit just before the mass variable renaming, 2. apply the tool to your downstream repo to mass-rename variables locally, and 3. rebase again to the head. Most changes made by the tool should be identical for a downstream repo and for the head, so at the step 3, almost all changes should be merged and disappear. I'd expect that there would be some lines that you need to merge by hand, but that shouldn't be too many. Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64121 llvm-svn: 365595
2019-07-10 13:00:37 +08:00
static X86 t;
return &t;
}